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Raghuram Rajan, Paolo Volpin, and Luigi Zingales 
It is difficult to think of an industry that was affected more by the wave of 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in the 1980s than the U.S. tire industry. 
Seventy-five percent of the companies in the industry (accounting for 90 
percent of the value) experienced a takeover bid or were forced to restruc- 
ture during the period 1982-89  (Mitchell and Mulherin 1996). As a result 
of this activity, control changed hands in over half the companies in this 
industry. Even more remarkable, in the majority  of  cases, control was 
transferred to foreign owners. By  the end of the decade, traditional Amer- 
ican firms like Firestone, Uniroyal, Goodrich, Armstrong, and General 
Tire belonged to foreign companies. As a consequence, large U.S.-owned 
tire manufacturers, who in 1971 represented 59 percent of the world pro- 
duction and included four out of the top five producers, in  1991 repre- 
sented only 17 percent of world production with only one of the top five 
producers (see table 2.1  below). These changes are even more dramatic 
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when compared with the stability of the relative market shares of US. tire 
manufacturers for the previous fifty years. 
The U.S. tire industry therefore presents an intriguing example of the 
changes wrought by the M&A wave that swept through the United States 
in the 1980s, and of its effect on the position of U.S. manufacturers in a 
global market. Anyone interested in the effects of M&A on the productiv- 
ity and the long-term competitiveness of the U.S. economy cannot ignore 
what has happened in this industry. The purpose of this paper, then, is to 
undertake an in-depth industry analysis of the events that led to the de- 
mise of US. ownership in the tire industry, and of the effects of mergers 
on industry restructuring and productivity. To do so we call upon a variety 
of different sources, ranging  from plant-level data to industry analyses 
(including contemporary  reports in trade publications),  interviews with 
executives, and accounting data. The goal is to attempt to explain why the 
merger wave occurred, why it was led by foreign producers, and what its 
effects have been. 
We are able to test (and reject) two main interpretations of these events. 
The first (neoclassical) hypothesis is that foreign manufacturers were more 
efficient in producing tires, and that this advantage (be it superior know- 
how or better management) could not be transferred to U.S. manufactur- 
ers without acquiring their plants. According to this view, the takeovers in 
the 1980s in the tire industry were simply a reflection of the fundamental 
tendency for assets to move to the most efficient producers. Contrary to 
this view, we find that plants are not acquired by the most efficient produc- 
ers (at least as far as plant-level productivity is concerned) and we do not 
find any evidence of an increase in plant-level productivity after an acqui- 
sition. 
A second explanation of the phenomena is advanced by Jensen (1993). 
He suggests that the evolution of the U.S. tire industry during the 1980s is 
a textbook example of the effects of  what he calls “the third industrial 
revolution.” According  to Jensen, rapid  technological change generates 
overcapacity in certain industries, requiring  some firms to downsize or 
exit. But “managers fail to recognize that they themselves must downsize; 
instead they leave the exit to others while they continue to invest. When 
all managers behave this way,  exit is significantly delayed at substantial 
cost of real resources to society. The tire industry is an example. Wide- 
spread consumer acceptance of radial tires meant that worldwide tire ca- 
pacity had to shrink by two-thirds (because radials last three to five times 
longer than bias ply tires). Nonetheless, the response by the managers of 
individual  companies was  often  equivalent  to:  ‘This business  is going 
through some rough times. We  have to make major investments so that 
we  will have a chair when  the music stops”’ (Jensen  1993, 847). Since 
internal control systems do not force managers to shrink, only the inter- 
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That the acquirers were  foreign rather than domestic is not relevant for 
this interpretation, all that matters is that they were  outsiders to the in- 
dustry. 
We  do not find much support for this interpretation  either. While, as 
suggested by  Jensen (1993), there were  some delays in closing bias ply 
capacity (also see Sull 1996), the industry had made most of the necessary 
closures by  the early 1980s-before  the takeovers started! More specifi- 
cally, we find no evidence that acquisitions hastened the closure of plants 
in general and more inefficient plants in particular. We also find that capi- 
tal expenditures increase after an acquisition, which is inconsistent with 
the overinvestment hypothesis. 
We then try to explore the reasons for the demise of the U.S. ownership 
in the tire industry by looking at the historical evolution of the tire indus- 
try in the United States and the rest of the world, with particular emphasis 
on the relationship between the car and the tire industries. The car indus- 
try plays an important role for two reasons. First, original equipment sales 
represent about one-quarter of all sales. Moreover, they have an important 
effect on the replacement sales given the tendency of consumers to buy 
the same type of tires. Second, major changes in type of tires used, like 
the introduction  of  radials, require some modifications in the design of 
cars. This raises an important coordination problem. 
The most striking aspect of the U.S. tire industry is its delay in the 
introduction  of radials. Michelin first commercially produced radials in 
France in 1948, and by  1970, 98 percent of tires sold in France were radi- 
als. The rest of Europe and Japan followed a similar path. Yet, in  1970 
radials represented only 2 percent of the tires sold in the United States. 
The technology was well known to U.S. manufacturers, who were using it 
in their European subsidiaries. An attempt by Goodrich to launch radial 
production in the United States in 1965 failed because of the strong oppo- 
sition of U.S. car manufacturers, who did not like the fact that radial tires 
required a new suspension system in the cars. Only in the beginning of the 
1970s did the car producers announce that they wanted to switch to radi- 
als. Therefore, U.S. tire manufacturers delayed the transition  to radials 
until the 1970s, a period characterized by the oil crisis and a severe reces- 
sion in the car industry. 
The switch to the radial technology required major capital investments 
because it was not economically feasible to convert the existing bias-ply 
capacity to producing radials; Firestone’s attempt to do so ended in fiasco. 
As a result, tire producers faced the prospect of making major capital 
investment in a low margin sector at the same time as the growth prospects 
for the entire sector looked grim. The major diversified tire companies 
(Goodrich in particular) made the conscious decision to reduce their capi- 
tal and development expenditure in the tire business, sell their foreign op- 
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royal, were less clear-cut about their prospects. However, barring Goodyear, 
all the tire manufacturers reduced their focus on tires. It is entirely possible 
that this was indeed the optimal strategy, since foreign producers had al- 
ready sunk their investment in radials, while U.S. producers had to sink at 
a time when the long-term growth prospect of the car industry (and thus 
indirectly of the tire industry) had worsened. 
One possible solution at this stage was a consolidation of the U.S. tire 
industry. There were two reasons, however, why that could not occur with- 
out the cooperation of outsiders. First, it was unclear whether such a move 
would be accepted by  the Federal Trade Commission. Second, and most 
important, automobile manufacturers strongly opposed any consolidation 
among their suppliers. They liked having a number of  independent tire 
suppliers to ensure competition. As a result, a merger between two tire 
suppliers would inevitably result in a redistribution of some of their share 
of the original equipment business to other tire manufacturers. The impor- 
tance to tire manufacturers of having original equipment sales to the auto- 
mobile manufacturers therefore precluded a large domestic tire manufac- 
turer from merging with another large domestic manufacturer (unless, of 
course, one of the manufacturers had no original equipment sales as was 
the case with Goodrich, which merged with Uniroyal). 
In the meantime, the economics of the industry were changing in other 
ways. Most important, automobile sales and manufacture were becoming 
increasingly international and there was a growing need for tire manu- 
facturers to follow their customers across countries. If  Honda cars are 
equipped  with  Bridgestone tires,  then  Honda’s  exports  in  the  United 
States automatically generate demand for Bridgestone tires in  the US. 
replacement market. It is only natural for Bridgestone, thus, to take ad- 
vantage of this demand by starting to sell in the United States. Given the 
high transportation costs, this will generate also the need for producing in 
the United States. 
The globalization of  the  car industry  also produced  the need  for  a 
higher level of research and development (R&D), which could be borne 
only if  spread over a higher volume of  sales. For example, Goodyear’s 
R&D and advertising expenses as a fraction of sales rose 27 percent be- 
tween 1970-75  and 1980-90.  As a result, only large multinational compa- 
nies could survive. 
If only multinationals could survive and there was not much room to 
build new capacity in any of the major industrialized countries, then only 
two possibilities were left: either the foreign producers acquired US. firms 
or U.S. firms acquired foreign producers. The latter alternative, however, 
was  not feasible since most of the foreign companies could not  be ac- 
quired. Michelin, for example, which is the major French tire producer, is 
fully controlled by a limited partnership, whose unlimited partner is Fran- 
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termines the future of Michelin. Similarly, the major German producer, 
Continental, is controlled by a complicated web of shareholdings that pre- 
vented Pirelli from taking it over in  1990. The Japanese firms are even 
harder to acquire. By  contrast, acquisitions, even acquisitions by foreign 
firms, were extremely easy in the United States during the 1980s. Although 
it is hard to establish how much of a role this asymmetry played, it is an 
important (and often ignored) factor that should be taken into consider- 
ation. 
We  therefore conclude that the roots of the dramatic change in the world 
and U.S. tire markets between 1970 and 1990 lie largely in the failure of 
U.S. tire manufacturers to adopt the radial technology when the rest of 
the world did so. Of course, hindsight is always 20/20. But even manufac- 
turers such as Goodrich who realized the potential of the technology back 
in 1965 could not force its widespread acceptance. The structure of  the 
domestic market, and specifically the relationship between the automobile 
manufacturers and the tire producers, was probably instrumental in re- 
tarding  adoption  of  the technology. In other words, even though they 
acted rationally and in their own self-interest, the structure of the domestic 
market led U.S. tire manufacturers-like  characters in a Greek tragedy- 
inexorably toward their doom. By contrast, the domestic market structure 
in  countries like  France  probably spurred  innovation. Thus the paper 
highlights a possible link between domestic market structure, innovation, 
and the ability to compete internationally. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2.1, we discuss 
the structure of the tire industry; in section 2.2, we discuss the reasons for 
the delay in the introduction of radials into the United States. Section 2.3 
tests the “neoclassical” and “overinvestment” hypotheses, while  section 
2.4 examines the hypotheses that the U.S. manufacturers willingly quit a 
business they were  too weak to compete in. Section 2.5 concludes with 
policy conjectures. 
2.1  The Structure of the Tire Industry 
2.1.1  History 
The tire industry had its beginnings in tires made for bicycles.’ At first, 
bicycles used solid rubber tires, but the invention of the pneumatic tire by 
John Dunlop in 1888 soon made it the dominant product. The industry 
took off on the back of  an explosion in the demand for bicycles in the 
1890s. By  the time the craze for bicycles waned in the beginning of  the 
twentieth century, automobiles started driving the demand for tires, and 
they account for the majority of tires manufactured today. 
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The early focus in product innovation was on making the tire fit the 
wheel without slipping, while at the same time making it easily removable. 
But  the  demand  for  product  innovation  did  not cease  once this  was 
achieved. Automobiles became heavier and faster, which triggered major 
innovations in tire manufacture including the introduction of patterned 
treads. French (1991) argues that these innovations enabled smaller firms 
such as Goodyear and Firestone to compete with the large bicycle tire 
manufacturers. 
Even though the basic form of the automobile tire was set by 1910, there 
have since been tremendous advances in the product. The introduction of 
balloon tires in the 1920s and, as we will detail shortly, radials in the 1970s 
were fundamental changes. Tires became flatter and wider, and tire life 
improved rapidly, especially in the 1920s and 1970s. Changes in manufac- 
turing technology accompanied the changes in product technology. The 
industry had moved to mass production using tire-building machines by 
the 1920s. French (1991, xv) suggests that “technical changes increasingly 
disadvantaged smaller producers and consolidated the position of larger 
firms, leading to a decline in the number of firms after 1920(’ Interestingly, 
innovation seems to have enabled small manufacturers to establish them- 
selves when the industry was in its infancy, but as the industry matured, it 
seemed to become a barrier to entry. This relationship between innovation 
and number of firms has been formalized and applied to the tire industry 
by Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994).2 
This is reflected in the market shares of the various manufacturers. Four 
of the five biggest producers of tires in  1970 (Goodyear, Firestone, U.S. 
Rubber [later Uniroyal], and Goodrich) were also among the five biggest 
in 1910. This is not to say that there was no entry or exit early on. For 
instance, sixty firms entered the industry in 1919-20  alone. But the turn- 
over was largely confined to the small firms and new entrants. The large 
firms and their market shares remained surprisingly stable. Moreover, en- 
try eventually dropped off with virtually no entry between 1929 and 1970. 
The major tire manufacturers in 1970-the  starting point for much of 
our analysis-had  somewhat different origins. BFGoodrich and US. Rub- 
ber (Uniroyal) were primarily rubber goods manufacturers before they be- 
gan producing tires. The tire business was a form of diversification for 
them. By contrast, Goodyear and Firestone started out in the tire business. 
The differences in their origins seemed to reflect the extent to which they 
diversified outside the tire industry, Goodrich and Uniroyal had approxi- 
mately 60 percent of their sales in the tire industry in 1970, while the figure 
was over 80 percent for both Firestone and Goodyear. The exception to 
this pattern is General Tire which started in 1915 by supplying repair ma- 
2. Interestingly, they end their analysis in 1973 on the basis that the introduction of radials 
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terial but soon began tire production in 1916. It had only 40 percent of its 
sales in tires by  1970. As we  will  see, the extent to which the firm was 
diversified appeared to influence top management’s commitment to stay 
in the business. 
2.1.2  Structure of the Industry circa 1970 
Table 2.1 shows the share of the world market for tires held by the major 
producers. Michelin was the only non-U.S. manufacturer in the top five in 
1971. The top four producers controlled 60 percent of the world market. 
According to Dick (1980), the tire industry has been heavily concentrated 
in this way since the thirties: in the U.S. market in 1935, the four largest 
producers accounted for 80 percent of the total sales; in 1958 their share 
was 74 percent, and at the end of the 1960s, 72 percent. 
Economies of scale in production do not seem to explain such a level 
of concentration. Plants in 1976 had capacity varying from 300 tires per 
day to 30,000 tires per day, with a mean capacity of 14,500 tires. Modern 
Tire Dealer reports there were fifty-five plants of significant size in 1976. 
That the minimum economic scale is not very large seems to be obliquely 
confirmed by John Ong, Chairman of the Board of BFGoodrich, “Today, 
under normal competitive conditions, it’s not economically feasible to op- 
erate a tire plant with capacity lower than  9,000 to 12,000 tires a day. 
Mixing, calendering, and other equipment investments mandate a mini- 
Table 2.1  World Market Share of the Largest Tire Producers 
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mum size.” This estimate would allow for about one hundred plants in the 
United States. 
2.1.3  Channels of Distribution 
The tire industry essentially serves two markets: the original equipment 
(OE) market and the replacement market. OE manufacturers are the auto- 
mobile  producers  who,  historically,  have  had  tremendous  bargaining 
power. In the words of William O’Neil Sr., founder of General Tire, “De- 
troit  wants tires  that  are round,  black,  and cheap-and  it  don’t care 
whether they are round and black” (Tedlow 1991, 15). The automobile 
manufacturers have been content to play tire manufacturers against each 
other without  actually  building  their  own  tire  factories (though  Ford 
briefly did so in 1938). But despite its low profitability, the OE market has 
historically been important because it provides large orders (and hence 
the scale) as well as the prospect of future replacement sales (car owners 
typically replace tires with the same original equipment brand). 
A possible explanation for the concentration of tire sales is that sales to 
the OE market are critical. The primary requirement of an OE supplier 
according to Rubber  World (January 1966) is that the supplier must be a 
technological innovator, As a tire veteran put it “You just can’t stand still 
with those boys [the automobile manufacturers]. . . . Your tires have to 
carry heavier loads, last longer and go faster. The smaller firms cannot 
afford the kind of  R&D operation this entails.” Another requirement  is 
that the tire manufacturer must be able to deliver the product. In other 
words, it must have “a distribution set-up capable of giving Detroit what 
it wants, where it’s wanted-and  on time. . . . It must have acceptance as 
[a] national supplier . . . it must be able to warehouse Detroit’s require- 
ments well ahead of the call, stockpiling them, in order to avoid the risk 
of strikes.” Finally, a sales network that is capable of servicing the OE tires 
is  an added advantage in obtaining OE orders. Thus the economies of 
scale in research and distribution appear to be an important element of 
this industry. 
Table 2.2 shows the share of the domestic OE market held by U.S. manu- 
facturers. Smaller manufacturers had a presence only in the replacement 
market, but even there, the majors controlled a significant fraction of the 
overall sales3  The automobile manufacturers did not buy from one tire 
supplier. Instead, they spread their orders among the tire manufacturers, 
though they had their favorites. For instance, Goodyear and Chrysler, Uni- 
royal and General Motors, and Firestone and Ford were thought to enjoy 
3. Most major manufacturers also produced for private labels. As a result, it is not easy 
to obtain an exact figure for the share of the replacement market controlled by each manu- 
facturer. If we  restrict our attention to the share of  the market controlled by  the majors 
under their original names, Goodyear controlled  13 percent of the replacement market in 
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Table 2.2  Tire Manufacturer Shares of Original Equipment Market in the 
United States 
Company  1968  1975  1980  1985  1990 
Goodyear  31.0  35.0  28.0  32.0  36.5 
Firestone  24.0  24.0  21.5  21.5  17.0 
Uniroyal  25.0  20.0  24.4  22.0  17.0 
Goodrich  15.0  8.0  10.3  0.0 
General Tire  5.0  11.5  10.8  13.0  12.0 
Mi  c  h e  1  in  1.5  5.0  11.0  15.7 
Continental  0.4 
Pirelli  0.1 
Dunlop  1.5 
Bridgestone  0.3 
Source: Modern Tire Dealer (1991). 
Note: This table presents each tire manufacturer’s share of sales to the OE market. All the 
figures are percentages of total sales of tires to automobile manufacturers  in the United 
States. 
special relationships. Since no foreign tire manufacturer produced locally, 
this explains why virtually the entire OE market was held by the five major 
U.S. manufacturers in 1970. 
The OE sales of 37.5 million tires in 1970 accounted for 22 percent of 
the market. The rest is  accounted for by  replacement sales that were a 
further 130 million tires and accounted for 77 percent of the market, while 
exports represented less than 1 percent. Buyers in the replacement market 
range from mail order and retail chains like Sears and Montgomery Ward, 
which became significant buyers in the 1920s, to oil companies that en- 
tered tire retailing in the 1930s, tire company stores, and independent mer- 
chants. In 1970, replacement sales were composed of sales to the service 
stations of large oil companies (15 percent), large department stores (15.5 
percent), tire company stores (1 1 percent), and independent tire dealers 
(56  percent).  Profits in  the  replacement market  have  historically been 
higher than in the OE market. Rosenbloom and Benioff (1990) report that 
in 1966 the profit margins were between 3 percent and 5 percent in the OE 
market and between 5 percent and 8 percent in the replacement market. 
In the replacement market, not all tires are sold under the producer’s 
own name. Part of the output sold to large oil companies and to depart- 
ment and chain stores were distributed under private names specific to the 
outlet. This market was especially important for smaller companies such 
as Armstrong and Mohawk, since they did not need to advertise in or- 
der to sell. The tire producers distributed the rest under their own names 
(the national brands), or under less well-known names called “associate 
brands.” As a result, even though the tires were produced by only a small 
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The market was effectively segmented; national brands that were highly 
advertised across the United States and were used as original equipment 
could command a higher price, while the other brands were sold in a very 
price-competitive market. 
2.1.4  Technology 
In the 1960s, there were fundamentally two different types of tire con- 
struction: bias ply and radial ply.  Technically, the two tires differ in the 
way the body cords are layered in the body of the tire. In bias ply tires, the 
cords are at an angle to the direction of rotation, while in radials they are 
perpendicular.  In practice,  the two  tires  differ substantially  in  perfor- 
mance. On well-maintained roads, bias tires ensure a smoother ride, but 
they are inferior to radials on bumpy roads and they do not hold the road 
as well when it is wet. The radial tire offers more safety with better braking 
and cornering power. Radial tires also give better gas mileage. The major 
difference, though, is in life expectancy: a bias ply tire lasts about twelve 
thousand miles while the radial lasts forty thousand miles. 
For reasons we shall discuss shortly, the tire manufacturers by and large 
continued to produce bias ply tires, though Goodrich made a failed at- 
tempt  to introduce radials  in  1965. From  1967 onward, however, they 
quickly switched to an intermediate product, the belted bias ply tire. This 
tire had much  of the ride characteristics  of the bias ply tire but lasted 
about twenty-four thousand miles. The belted bias tire had one advantage 
over radials: it was much cheaper to convert existing production lines to 
produce belted bias tires. In 1970, approximately 85 percent of tires manu- 
factured were belted bias ply tires. 
2.1.5  Investment and Financial State 
The majors invested substantial amounts in the 1960s as they expanded 
production and switched production to belted bias ply (while conversion 
was cheaper than converting to radials, it was not costless). Goodyear 
opened four new plants over this decade while Firestone opened three. 
Both Goodyear and Firestone were largely in tire production, so Compu- 
stat firm-level data can be used as an approximate measure of their in- 
vestment in tires (domestic and foreign). Both firms invested 6 percent of 
sales, on average, in the first half of the 1960s, and 8 percent on average 
in the second half. 
Despite the substantial investment (the majors did not invest such large 
amounts relative to sales again), the majors entered the 1970s in reason- 
ably good financial condition. Interest coverage ( earnings before interest, 
taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA)/interest expense) ranged 
from a low of 3 for Goodrich to a high of 7 for Firestone. Netting out 
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high of  0.38 for Goodrich to a low  of 0.23 for Firestone. Interestingly, 
Goodyear, which was the only major to survive, entered the 1970s right in 
the middle of the pack in terms of leverage. 
2.1.6  Industrial Relations 
The last important aspect of the tire industry to be considered is indus- 
trial relations. Workers in the tire industry were organized by the United 
Rubber Workers (URW) during the  1930s and early 1940s. Historically, 
wages in tire plants have moved in tandem with increases in the Big Three 
auto contracts. This principle has underlined URW bargaining since the 
forties. Competition  from imports, however, placed greater pressure on 
tire companies to reduce costs over the 1970s and 1980s. In response, man- 
agement attempted less expensive settlements. Also, they shifted produc- 
tion by  opening new  plants in the southern part of  the United  States, 
where unions were less strong. As a result, of the nine plants constructed 
since 1970, only one has been organized, while all twenty-one plants built 
during the 1960s were organized. 
2.2  Radial Technology and Its Delayed Entry in the U.S. Market 
In 1970, U.S. manufacturers were the largest in the world with extensive 
international  operations.  Looming  ahead, however, was  the  specter of 
wrenching change for the tire manufacturers. Even though they had just 
converted to the intermediate technology of belted bias ply tires, the single 
most important issue faced by  the tire industry in the beginning of the 
1970s was the impending arrival of radial tires. Contrary to popular belief, 
neither were radials a new technology nor did the oil crisis in late 1973 
precipitate their introduction. This raises the question why the US. manu- 
facturers sunk so much in the intermediate belted bias technology rather 
than moving directly to radials, and why they then took so long to intro- 
duce radials. We  argue that both the U.S.  automobile and tire industries 
were in a low technology equilibrium that was disrupted only by the entry 
of foreign manufacturers. 
2.2.1 
The radial tire was invented in 1913 by Gray and Sloper of the Palmer 
Tyre Company (United Kingdom). In 1948, Michelin first introduced the 
tire into commercial production (the Incredible X) and patented a radial 
with a steel belt. In 1951, Pirelli patented its own radial tire, with rayon 
belts (named Cinturato), and in the late fifties, Continental, Dunlop, and 
the European subsidiaries of Goodyear, Firestone, and Uniroyal started 
the production of radial tires. In 1970, when over 98 percent of tires manu- 
factured in the United States were bias ply  or belted bias ply, 97 percent 
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of tires in France and 80 percent of tires in Italy were radials. Thus, radial 
technology was not commercially new, nor was it unknown to U.S. manu- 
facturers. It simply was not used in the United States. 
2.2.2  Production Technology 
In 1970, radial production required 20 to 35 percent more labor than 
bias tires. Furthermore, it required substantial investment and changes in 
the method of production. “One of the certainties about radial-ply manu- 
facture is that, new production equipment will be a necessity . . . new tire 
building machines, fabric and wire bias-cutters, new or modified curing, 
special stacking and handling systems, and (perhaps) new feeding equip- 
ment. This is due to the radial’s unique construction” (Rubber World, No- 
vember  1965). Moreover, radials necessitated  closer tolerances,  stricter 
quality control, and frequent inspections, and the percentage of scrap and 
defective radial tires was twice as high as with conventional tires. Another 
reason for their increased cost was that the raw materials needed to pro- 
duce a radial tire cost 35 percent more than for a bias tire. 
2.2.3 
Automobile manufacturers in the United States had grown complacent 
over the 1960s. Tedlow (1991,24) points out that the 1967 Cadillac Eldor- 
ado was “priced at $6,277” and, weighing in at three thousand pounds, 
“plowed through tight corners in ungainly fashion and got only ten miles 
to the gallon.” The Mercedes Benz 250 of that year weighed half a ton 
less, cost  two thousand  dollars less, was more  than a foot  and a half 
shorter, and ran twice as long on a gallon of gas. American cars were built 
to be land cruisers, floating on large highways and fueled by cheap gas. 
The smooth, mushy ride that manufacturers thought consumers required 
could only be provided by the bias ply tires. The emphasis in automobile 
design was not so much on the handling or product quality but on looks. 
“There was only one kind of car headquarters wanted to hear about: A 
Car Just Like Last Years” (Easterbrook  1992, 317). The problem, how- 
ever, was that customer preferences had changed considerably: they now 
wanted better handling, quality, and-after  the oil crisis-mileage.  This 
was reflected in the rising tide of automobile imports as Detroit failed to 
meet the needs of its  customer^.^ 
2.2.4  The Diffusion of the Radial Tire in the United States 
Seeing the changing preferences of consumers, Ford in  1970 and Gen- 
eral Motors in 1972 announced plans to introduce models with steel belted 
The Attitude of the Automobile Manufacturers 
4.  It is also possible that the driving experience with car imports led customers to acquire 
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radials. “Suddenly [the tire manufacturer’s] expectations were confounded 
by dramatic external changes, and the switch to radials had to be under- 
taken swiftly. . . .”  (French  1991, 101). What were  the changed expecta- 
tions? In 1972, Rubber Age projected the growth of the radial market in 
the United States based on the diffusion of the tire in the German and 
U.K.  markets. It estimated that the radial ply would grow from 3 percent 
of the OEM market in 1972 to 65 percent in 1976. It was somewhat more 
conservative in  its estimate of  penetration  in  the  replacement market, 
given the popularity of belted bias ply tires. Rubber Age felt radials would 
have 30 percent of the replacement market by 1976. Sull(l996) also argues 
that two tire manufacturers in 1973 made similar projections for 1976. 
These estimates are important because they preceded the oil crisis (re- 
call that the trebling of  oil prices was unimaginable until it actually oc- 
curred in late 1973). It is amazing that the actual penetration  of radials 
in the OE market in 1976 was 64 percent, while in the replacement market 
it was 29  percent  (table 2.3). This suggests that  at least some industry 
sources could see the writing on the wall, and the forces precipitating the 
change to radials were in place even prior to the oil crisis. This view  is 
confirmed by our conversations with industry sources. 
What is puzzling about the switch to radials is not that it occurred so 
fast. In fact, the switch from bias ply to belted bias ply toward the end of 
the 1960s occurred even faster. The puzzle is why  radials were not intro- 
duced while belted bias ply tires were-the  latter almost as soon as they 
could be produced commercially. As we will argue, this delay in adopting 
an innovation that the rest  of  the world had  already implemented put 
US. industry at a disadvantage. We will also attempt to explain why  the 
introduction took place when it did. These are critical to understanding 
the takeovers in the 1980s. 
2.2.5  Causes for the Delayed Introduction of the Radial Tire 
Three special characteristics of radials explain why  U.S.  manufacturers 
settled into a low technology equilibrium. First, car suspensions have to 
be built differently to accommodate radials. This involves substantial rede- 
sign and investment. Thus, unlike the change from bias to belted bias, the 
change to radials required the support of the automobile manufacturers. 
As we  have already pointed out, the car manufacturers were reluctant to 
abandon the cushy ride offered by the bias ply tires even though consumer 
preferences may have been changing. Thus the reluctance to innovate up- 
stream hampered innovation downstream. To complicate matters, radials 
were a radically different technology, unlike the belted bias ply tires. While 
U. S. manufacturers had some experience in manufacturing radials in their 
European subsidiaries, they were certainly not the leaders (see Rubber 
World, April  1976). Adapting radials to US. cars and U.S. production 64  Raghuram Rajan, Paolo Volpin, and Luigi Zingales 
Table 2.3  Relative Importance of Original Equipment and Replacement 
Tire Markets 
Original Equipment  Replacement 
Market  Market 
Total  Yo  Total  Yo  Car 






















































































































































































Note: Passenger tire shipments in the OE market and the replacement market are in thou- 
sands of units and are taken from the Rubber Manufacturers Association (1994). The num- 
ber of cars produced (also in thousands of units) is from Ward's Automotive Year Book, Ship- 
ments. 
methods  still required  considerable  innovation.  Thus US. automobile 
manufacturers did not have an assured supply of high quality radials if, in 
fact, they decided to switch. 
Second, unlike with belted bias tires, radials could not be manufactured 
on the same machinery  as bias ply tires. Enormous investment in new 
machinery was required to change to radial manufacture. But the third 
factor comes in here. In the OE market. much of the rents from the im- The Eclipse of the U.S. Tire Industry  65 
proved technology would be extracted by the automobile manufacturers. 
And the technology had the potential to shrink the replacement market 
even more than belted bias ply tires. Thus rents from the new technology 
would accrue largely to the automobile manufacturers, and indirectly to 
consumers, while the investments costs would be wholly borne by the tire 
man~facturer.~  To summarize, there were two barriers to switching to the 
radial technology: a coordination problem and a rent sharing problem. 
The coordination  problem  was  that  car manufacturers  were  afraid  to 
change their designs absent a serious commitment to radials by tire manu- 
facturers. Tire manufacturers, on the other hand, were unwilling to make 
the massive investments in moving to radials without  the assurance of 
rents from a large market.6 Yet,  in all likelihood, it appeared that their 
most profitable market (the replacement market) would shrink as a result 
of  the longer life of the new product. This appears to be a textbook ex- 
ample of the hold-up problem as modeled by Grossman and Hart (1986). 
What was different in the other countries? Consider France, which was 
the first to switch to radials. When Michelin introduced the radial tire, it 
controlled Citroen, having acquired it in the 1930s when Citroen was un- 
able to repay the debts owed to the tire company. Thus the coordination 
and rent sharing problem in upstream and downstream innovation was 
solved by  the simple expedient of vertical integration. Moreover, the tire 
market in France was dominated by Michelin (it had 63 percent of domes- 
tic market share in 1975 with the second producer having only 12 percent; 
see West 1984,44). So not only could it keep some of the rents from inno- 
vation while dealing with other car manufacturers, it could also capture 
rents in the replacement market from the improved product. As in Gross- 
man and Hart (1986), the hold-up problem is resolved by integration. 
Even  though  tire  manufacturers  in  Italy,  Germany, and  the  United 
Kingdom did not own automobile manufacturers, they adopted quickly. 
This was because once Michelin had shown the success of the radial, it 
could offer  it in  neighboring countries where it had  a  f~othold.~  This 
forced tire manufacturers in the other countries to offer radials. 
5. Implicit in this argument is that the OE market and the replacement market are only 
loosely connected so that the automobile manufacturer does not extract all the rents from 
replacement sales also. If consumers always replaced tires on their car with the same brand, 
then presumably the automobile manufacturer could extract not only the profits on the OE 
tire but also the profits on the replacement. 
6. West (1984) focuses on this last issue: “the way in which the US transnationals delayed 
launching the radial tire in their home market is a classic example of the use of market power 
by large firms to slow down the pace of innovation in an industry” We, however, believe that 
automobile manufacturers also played an important part in the delay. 
7. West  (1984) reports that Michelin had 30 percent of the Italian market in 1973, 23 
percent of the U.K. market in 1972, and 21 percent of the German market in 1975. It should 
also be noted that Pirelli independently made substantial innovations in radial manufacture. 
Furthermore, unlike Michelin, it appropriated the rents not by manufacturing elsewhere but 
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What changed in the United States in the early 1970s to propel adop- 
tion? Ford and GM expressed the intent to start manufacturing cars with 
radials. An important factor in this decision was Michelin’s  decision in 
1970 to reenter the U.S.  market (which it had abandoned in  1930) and 
produce radials from a plant in Nova Scotia. Not coincidentally, it ob- 
tained a contract to produce radials for the 1970 Ford Continental at the 
same time (see Tedlow 1991). In mid-1973 Michelin also announced plans 
to build two tire plants in the United States (Wall Street Journal, 28 Au- 
gust 1973). 
Another  factor was the growing volume of automobile imports from 
Europe and Japan that convinced manufacturers of changing consumer 
preferences, even before the oil crisis. Once the automobile manufacturers 
signed on to the new tire technology, and there was a credible high-quality 
producer (Michelin) to supply it, the low technology equilibrium was bro- 
ken. Now the competitive nature of the industry forced all the manufactur- 
ers to either adopt the technology or exit. The oil crisis in 1973 did not initi- 
ate the move to radials. It simply reinforced and perhaps accelerated it. 
2.2.6  The Structure of the Tire Industry and Innovation 
A number of issues have been highlighted about the industry that will 
help us in our later discussion of the causes of the takeovers. First, rents 
in this business exist only in markets where firms interact with individuals; 
the intermediate goods market is very competitive. Second, the tire indus- 
try is mature enough that it is hard for manufacturers to get a sustainable 
advantage through innovation. Finally, there is a coordination problem es- 
pecially when both the upstream tire manufacturers and downstream auto- 
mobile manufacturers have to innovate. 
These features of the market explain why  the returns to innovation ac- 
crue, if  at all, to the largest tire manufacturers who have a substantial 
presence in  the replacement market,  while the  costs of  innovation are 
borne by all. Goodrich failed in its early attempt to introduce radials in 
the United States in  1965 because it could not convince the automobile 
manufacturers to switch. Goodyear, on the other hand, was not the first 
out with the belted bias ply  tire. But once it saw customer acceptance of 
the belted bias, it accelerated development and retained its share of both 
the OE market and the replacement market. Of  course, once Goodyear 
switched to  producing  belted  bias,  the  automobile  manufacturers  de- 
manded it of the other manufacturers. 
Similarly, when radials were introduced, Goodyear was not in the van- 
guard of innovators. It misjudged the acceptability of the tire and lost a 
few points in OE market share between 1972 and  1974. But once it was 
convinced the radial was there to stay, it switched its substantial resources 
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position in the replacement market gave it an advantage in recovering 
market share in the OE market. The nod of approval from Goodyear then 
made radials the de facto industry standard. The other manufacturers had 
to scramble to adapt. 
With this understanding of the industry and the dramatic impact of the 
introduction of radials, we  will return to the question of why  the major 
U.S. producers were acquired by foreign firms. Before doing so, however, 
we next review the major events in the merger and acquisition wave. 
2.2.7  The Corporate Control Events 
The tire industry has a long M&A  history. In 1968, shortly after the 
failed attempt to introduce radials, Goodrich was the target of one of the 
first hostile takeover attempts in  U.S.  history. Goodrich,  however,  suc- 
ceeded in fending off  that attempt and there is  no record of  any major 
corporate control transaction until 1985. 
As table 2.4 indicates, in  1985 Uniroyal had to undertake a defensive 
leverage buyout in response to a hostile bid by  Carl Icahn. At the same 
time, Sumitomo (a Japanese company) emerged as a white knight to rescue 
Dunlop (a British company) from a hostile bid. In the next five  years, 
every major U.S. tire producer had to face a hostile bid and all but one, 
Goodyear, ended up being acquired by  foreign manufacturers. Table 2.4 
also  shows  the  relationship  between  acquisitions  and  plant  closure. 
Clearly, most plant closures took place between 1978 and 1981, well before 
the beginning of the intense takeover activity. 
2.3  An Empirical Analysis of the Possible Causes 
of the Acquisitions by Foreign Firms 
We  now test the  “neoclassical” and  “overinvestment” hypotheses set 
forth earlier in the introduction. 
2.3.1 
The first hypothesis is that the acquisition of existing plants by foreign 
producers was the best way to transfer plants into the hands of more effi- 
cient producers. To address this question, we  analyze plant-level produc- 
tivity following an acquisition. In particular, we  test two direct implica- 
tions of  the hypothesis that foreign manufacturers acquired U.S. plants 
because they were more efficient. First, we should observe higher produc- 
tivity in plants owned by  foreign manufacturers. Second, we  should ob- 
serve an increase in the productivity following an acquisition, especially 
an acquisition by foreigners. 
Higher Productivity of Foreign Producers? Table 2.4  Chronology of Events in the U.S. Tire Industry 
















Firestone (Bloomington, Ill.) 
Goodyear (Danville, Va.) 
General (Charlotte, N.C.) 
Goodyear (Union City, Tenn.) 
Mohawk (Salem, Va.) 
Mohawk (Salem, Va.) 
Dunlop (Huntsville, Ala.) 
Firestone (Oklahoma City, Okla.) 
Goodyear (Fayetteville, N.C.) 
Uniroyal (Ardmore, Okla.) 
Hostile takeover attempt against 
Goodrich by Northwest Ind. 
Firestone (Lavergne, Tenn.) 
Firestone (Wilson, N.C.) 
General (Mt. Vernon, Ill.) 
Michelin (Greenville, S.C.) 
Armstrong buys Nashville (Tenn.) plant 
from Gates 
Goodyear (Lawton, Okla.) 
Michelin (Dothan, Ala.) 
Goodrich (Akron, Ohio) 
Goodyear (Akron, Ohio) 
Mansfield (Mansfield, Ohio) 
Mohawk (Akron, Ohio) 
Uniroyal (Los Angeles, Cal.) 
Iri (Louisville, Ky.) 
Mohawk (West Helena, Ark.) 
Firestone (Barbeton, Ohio) 
Firestone (Dayton, Ohio) 
Firestone (Los Angeles, Cal.) 
Firestone (Salinas, Cal.) 













Michelin (Lexington, S.C.) 
Firestone and Bridgestone agreement for 
Lavergne (Tenn.) plant ($52 million) 
Cooper buys Tupelo (Miss.) plant from 
Mansfield 
Hostile takeover (BTR) attempt against 
Dunlop, bailed out by  Sumitomo 
Hostile takeover attempt (C. Icahn) 
against Uniroyal 
Uniroyal and Goodrich merge in Uni- 
Goodrich 
Hostile takeover attempt (Goldsmith) 
against Goodyear 
Continental buys General ($650 million) 
Goodrich adopts antitakeover plan 
Pirelli’s bid for Firestone 
Bridgestone buys Firestone ($2.6 billion) 
Pirelli buys Armstrong ($197 million) 
Yokohama buys Mohawk ($150 million) 
Cooper buys Firestone’s Albany (Ga.) 
Michelin buys Uni-Goodrich 
plant 
Goodrich (Miami, Okla.) 
Goodrich (Oaks, Pa.) 
Firestone (Albany, Ga.) 
General (Waco, Tex.) 
Goodyear (Cumberland, Md.) 
Cooper (Albany, Ga.) 
Uniroyal (Chicopee Falls, Mass.) 
Uniroyal (Detroit, Mich.) 
Armstrong (West Haven, Conn.) 
Firestone (Akron, Ohio) 
Firestone (Memphis, Tenn.) 
Goodyear (Conshocken, Pa.) 
Goodyear (Jackson, Mich.) 
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Data 
The plant-level data we use come from the Longitudinal Research Data- 
base (LRD) maintained at the Center for Economic Studies (CES) at the 
Bureau of the Census. The LRD file is a time series of economic variables 
collected from manufacturing establishments in the Census of Manufac- 
tures (CM) and Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM) programs. 
The census universe covers approximately 350,000 establishments. The 
CM reports data on all these establishments every five years (in years end- 
ing in “2” and “7’7, while the ASM covers a subset of the universe in each 
of the four years between censuses. The ASM, though, contains a com- 
plete time series for establishments with 250 or more employees. 
The LRD file contains  identifying  information  at  the establishment 
level, basic information on the factors of production (inputs such as levels 
of capital, labor, energy, and materials) and the products produced (out- 
puts), and other basic economic information used to define the operations 
of a manufacturing plant. In addition to these items, since 1972, establish- 
ments in the ASM sample panel have been asked to supply detailed infor- 
mation on assets, rental payments, supplemental labor costs, consumption 
of specific types of fuels, and other selected items. Unlike the census, the 
ASM does not request data on individual materials consumed and prod- 
ucts shipped, although product class information is collected. These data, 
thus, are available only in census years. 
Because we  are interested  in  U.S. tire plants,  we  extracted  from  the 
LRD  all the data on manufacturing establishments with SIC code 301 1 (tire 
and inner tubes). We  identified 3,061 plant-year observations from 493 
plants and 402 firms. The first year for which we have comprehensive data 
is 1967. The next year of data is 1972, after which we have data for all the 
years until 1993. 
To maximize the homogeneity of the group we analyze, we restrict our 
analysis to passenger tire plants (primary product code l), ignoring truck 
tires and other special tires. This reduces our sample to 71 plants and 741 
plant-years. Twenty-one observations and four plants lack some or all of 
the data required by our specification. This leaves us with 67 plants corre- 
sponding to 720 plant-years. 
Table 2.5 contains the summary statistics for this data set. Note that the 
census data are confidential and this prevents us reporting data when it 
would reveal the identity of a single company in the sample. All the re- 
ported analysis based on LRD data will, by necessity, be aggregated. 
To check how exhaustive the ASM is, to obtain data on plant ownership 
from an independent source, and to produce a series of dummy variables 
(foreign, acquisition, and nonunionization), we collected a data set on pas- 
senger tire plants from the trade magazine Modern Tire Dealer. Starting 
in  1976, the January issue of the journal lists all U.S. tire plants,  their The Eclipse of the U.S. Tire Industry  71 
Table 2.5  Summary Statistics 
A. Continuous Variables 
Means  Stand. Dev.  N. Obs. 
Value added  11.08  0.99  720 
Capital  4.92  0.95  720 
Labor  7.90  0.68  720 
Capital expenditures  0.05  0.17  720 
Employment  7.20  0.68  720 
B. Discrete Variables 





13  1.82  712 
107  14.86  720 
110  15.28  720 
96  13.33  720 
Note: Value added is the logarithm of a plant’s value added measured in thousands of U.S. 
dollars. Capital is the logarithm of the net amount of property, plant, and equipment. Labor 
is  the  logarithm  of  production-worker-equivalent  man-hours,  as defined  in  Lichtenberg 
(1992). The foreign ownership indicator is one if  the plant is owned by  a foreign company 
in that particular year. The acquisition indicator is one in all plant-years following a change 
in control taking place in the period 1970-93. The nonunion indicator is one for those plants 
that were not unionized. All the data are from the LRD, except for foreign ownership and 
unionization indicators. which are constructed from data in Modern Tire Dealer. 
production  capacity, their  location,  the  company  they belong to,  and 
(starting in  1984) whether the plant is unionized or not. We  identified a 
sample of 66 plants. Overall our impression is that the LRD data set is 
representative of passenger tire plants operating in the United States8 
Methodology 
We want to compare productivity across different plants and over time. 
It is standard in this literature (see Lichtenberg 1992) to use the notion of 
total factor productivity, defined as output per unit of total input: 
where  VA is output net of purchased intermediate goods and F(L, K)  is a 
production function, with L denoting labor input and K capital input. 
If we assume that the production function is Cobb-Douglas so that F(L, 
K)  = LaKp and we take logarithms, we obtain 
(2)  logVA  =  alogL +  PlogK + logn. 
8. For disclosure-related reasons we  cannot give further detail about the nature of and 
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If  we  assume the  technical parameters  a and  p are invariant across 
plants, we  can test our hypotheses using the following specification: 
(3)  logVAl, =  f(X,)  +  alogL,, +  PlogK,, +  &Year, +  E~,, 
Where f(X,) are plant-specific characteristics (like ownership, unioniza- 
tion, etc.), Year, is a calendar year dummy, and E,,  is an error, which we 
assume orthogonal to the input quantities. 
Results 
Panel A of table 2.6 reports the results obtained by  estimating equation 
(3). Columns (1) to (3) estimate equation (3) with ordinary least squares 
(OLS) on the entire sample of plants. The plant-specific characteristics we 
test are an acquisition indicator (equal to one in the years subsequent to 
an acquisition), a foreign ownership indicator (equal to one if  the plant 
belongs to a subsidiary of  a foreign manufacturer),  an indicator  if  the 
plant is not unionized,and the age of the plant measured as years since 
the plant was built.9 
Column (1) tests whether foreign-owned plants are more or less produc- 
tive in general. The estimates indicate that the total factor productivity of 
foreign-owned plants is 20 percent  less than that of U.S.-owned plants. 
This effect is highly statistically significant. There is no evidence that non- 
unionized plants are more productive. Column (2) adds the acquisition 
indicator to the basic specification. Plants that have been acquired are 9 
percent less productive after an acquisition, but this effect is not statisti- 
cally significant even at the 10 percent level. The results are substantially 
unchanged if we insert a measure of a plant’s age (col. [3]). 
It is possible that the estimated adverse effects of foreign ownership are 
the result of some misspecification. We  might miss some plant-specific 
characteristics that reduce productivity and happen to be correlated with 
the foreign ownership indicator. For example, since foreigners bought, 
rather than started, most of their U.S. plants, it is possible that the ob- 
served effect captures adverse selection rather than inefficiency: foreigners 
buy less-productive  plants. For this reason we reestimate equation (3) (esti- 
mates not reported) restricting the sample to new plants. Productivity of 
foreign-owned plants is again significantly less than US.-owned plants. 
Is it that foreign acquirers pick poor plants, or are they poor managers? 
We  try to control better for plant-specific characteristics by  reestimating 
equation (3) with plant fixed effects. Since our measure of capital is a noisy 
proxy for the real level of capital, it is not surprising that the coefficient 
on capital drops by  50  percent and becomes insignificant. However, the 
indicators are the variables of interest. Controlling for the plant-specific 
9. Since we do not have data on construction years before 1960, for any plant built before 
1960 we  set the year of construction to 1959. Table 2.6  Effects of Ownership on Productivity 






















































Acquisition dummy  -0.249 
(0.061) 


























































































C. Whole Sample, Proxy for Capital 
Capital (energy)  0.280 
(0.054) 
Labor  0.870 
(0.046) 
(0.052) 
Foreign dummy  -0.135 
Acquisition dummy 






















0.207  0.209 
(0.079)  (0.078) 
0.997  1.003 
(0.096)  (0.095) 
0.199 
(0.102) 
-0.227  -0.340 
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Table 2.6  (continued) 
C. Whole Sample, Proxy for Capital 
Age  -0.001  0.056 
(0,001)  0.004 
Adjusted R2  0.867  0.868  0.868  0.912  0.912  0.912 
N. obs.  729  729  729  729  729  729 
Note: The dependent variable is the logarithm of a plant’s value added in a given year. Capital is the 
logarithm of the net amount of property, plant, and equipment. In panel C the logarithm of constant 
price energy consumption has been used as a proxy for capital. Labor is the logarithm of production- 
worker-equivalent man-hours, as defined in Lichtenberg (1992). The foreign ownership indicator is one 
if the plant is owned by a foreign company in that particular year. The acquisition indicator is one in all 
plant-years following a change in control taking place in the period 1970--93. The nonunion indicator is 
one for those plants that were not unionized. Age is the number of years since the plant was originally 
built. For plants built before 1960, we  set the year of construction to 1959. All the data are from the 
LRD, except for foreign ownership, unionization indicators (which are constructed from data in Mod- 
ern  Tire Dealer), and age of the plant (which is from  Tire Business). All the specifications contain 
calendar year indicators (coefficient estimates not reported). Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors 
are reported in parentheses. 
characteristics, an acquisition reduces a plant’s total factor productivity 
by a statistically significant 25 percent. This phenomenon is not just tem- 
porary. In an unreported regression we allowed for the impact of an acqui- 
sition to be different in the two years following an acquisition and in the 
long run. The effect is entirely concentrated in the long run. The effects 
are robust to the inclusion of a measure of the age of the plant. Older 
plants are less productive, 0.2 percent per year of age. 
When we  include plant-specific effects, the acquisition indicator is al- 
most collinear with the foreign indicator (there are only few acquisitions 
that are not made by  foreign firms). Nevertheless, we  try including both 
variables in the regression. The effect of acquisition is still negative and 
bigger in absolute sign, while the incremental effect of foreign ownership 
(separate from that of acquisition) is positive and statistically significant. 
The combined effect of a foreign acquisition, though, remains negative: it 
reflects a 17 percent drop in total factor productivity. Interestingly, the co- 
efficient of age becomes positive and highly statistically significant. This 
suggests that while newer plants are more productive, a plant itself becomes 
more productive with  age.  Hence the difference in  coefficient between 
the OLS and the fixed effects estimates. 
Although we  could not reject the hypothesis that the production func- 
tion for plants was the same independent of the quantity of radials pro- 
duced, in panel B of table 2.6 we  test the robustness of our result to re- 
stricting the estimates to plants producing at least 80 percent radials. The The Eclipse of the U.S. Tire Industry  75 
main thrust of the results is unchanged. If anything the results are more 
striking: foreign-owned plants are 50 percent (rather than 20 percent) less 
productive than US.-owned plants. 
Since our measure of the capital stock is likely to be very noisy, in panel 
C of table 2.6 we report the basic regressions when the amount of energy 
consumed is used as a proxy for capital. The coefficient for capital and 
labor now appears more sensible, but all the other results remain substan- 
tially unchanged. In an unreported regression we  also estimated the same 
specifications using the quantity of energy consumed as an instrumental 
variable. The results are substantially unchanged. 
In sum, little support emerges for this narrow version of the neoclassical 
hypothesis, which focuses on plant-level productivity. Plants do not seem 
to be acquired by more efficient producers. Even more surprisingly, plants 
do not experience an increase in productivity following a change of owner- 
ship. This implies that if we want to explain the M&A activity of the late 
1980s, we have to look elsewhere. 
2.3.2 
The second hypothesis we  want to test is  that acquisitions forced the 
closure of inefficient plants that were  kept open long after they became 
unprofitable because of a failure of internal control systems. The argument 
is that internal systems do not force managers to downsize when needed 
(Jensen 1993), and market forces take a long time to act because internal 
resources take a long time to be fully dissipated. 
This hypothesis has already been challenged by Sull(1996), who docu- 
ments that 69 percent of  the plant closures took place before 1981, the 
year of the first hostile takeover threat in the tire industry. He also shows 
that the adoption of antitakeover devices is not significantly related with 
the plant closure. 
Here we extend Sull’s analysis in three ways. First, we consider the effect 
of acquisitions themselves on the probability of plant closure. Second, we 
control for the total factor productivity of the plant. Third, we  fully use 
the data on the time dimension by  estimating the probability of  closing 
a plant between time t and time t + 1, conditional on it not having been 
closed till time t. This captures the essence of Jensen’s hypothesis that a 
failure of the internal  control  system delayed the closing of inefficient 
plants. 
Results 
The results obtained estimating a proportional hazard ratio model of 
the probability of closing a plant are shown in table 2.7. Column (1) re- 
ports the estimates obtained when the only determinants of plant closure 
are the logarithm of total factor productivity, as defined in equation (2), 
and calendar year dummies. Not surprisingly, more efficient plants are less 
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Table 2.7  Determinants of Plant Closures 
(3)  (4) 
Total factor productivity  -1.73 
(0.61) 
Acquisition dummy 







-1.82  -1.85 
(0.63)  (0.63) 
(1.26)  (1.36) 
0.61 
(1.92) 
-0.78  -0.80 
0.11  0.12 
549  549 










Note: We estimate a proportional hazard ratio model, where the dependent variable is the 
probability of closure between year t and year t+ 1 conditional on surviving up to time t. 
The explanatory variables are the total factor productivity as estimated with specification 
(3) in the text, a foreign ownership indicator, and an acquisition indicator. The foreign own- 
ership indicator is one if the plant is owned by  a foreign company in that particular year. 
The acquisition indicator is one in all plant-years following a change in control taking place 
in the period 1970-93.  The nonunion indicator is one for those plants that were not union- 
ized. All the data are from the LRD, except for foreign ownership and unionization indica- 
tors, which are constructed from data in Modern Tire Dealer. All the specifications contain 
calendar year indicators  (coefficient estimates not reported).  The standard errors are re- 
ported in parentheses. 
likely to be closed, and this effect is statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level. More interesting for our purposes is column (2). It shows that acqui- 
sition of a company has no impact on the probability of closing a plant 
(after the efficiency of the plant is accounted for). If anything, the impact 
is  negative  (albeit  not  statistically significant). A  more  direct  test  of 
whether acquisitions improved the ability of managers to close inefficient 
plants is to examine the differential effect of produchvity on plant closure 
when a firm is acquired. As column (3) shows, less productive plants were 
no more likely to be closed by  acquirers. Similar results obtain when a 
plant is owned (or acquired) by a foreign firm. So there is no evidence that 
different corporate governance systems or external threats had any impact 
on the decision to close a plant.1° Nor is there evidence that acquisitions 
changed the speed of plant closing. 
A different approach to the same question is to analyze the behavior of 
capital expenditures following an acquisition. If acquisitions were aimed 
at disciplining managers who were overinvesting in their plants, we should 
observe a reduction in investment following an acquisition. In fact, as 
table 2.8 shows, the opposite is true. The level of capital expenditure (over 
sales) of  a plant goes up by  four percentage points after an acquisition 
10. The raw data confirm this. No plant was closed by  a foreign manufacturer and, as 
pointed out earlier, most of the closures took place prior to acquisition. Table 2.8  Effects of Acquisitions on Capital Expenditure and Employment 
Capital Expenditures  Employment 
OLS  Fixed Effects  OLS  Fixed Effects 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.11)  (0.09)  (0.08)  (0.10) 
Acquisition dummy  0.02  0.01  0.04  0.00  -0.43  0.15  -0.02  -0.19 
Foreign dummy  0.01  0.04  -0.50  0.09 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.10)  (0.05) 
Nonunion dummy  0.15  0.13 
0.07  0.07 
Adjusted R2  0.01  0.01  0.61  0.61  0.02  0.02  0.81  0.79 
N. obs.  73 1  73 1  73 1  73 1  73 1  73 1  73  1  73 1 
Note: The dependent variables are either the level of capital expenditure over sales or the logarithm of the number of plant employees in the year. The 
foreign ownership indicator is one if the plant is owned by  a foreign company in that particular year. The acquisition indicator is one in all plant-years 
following a change in control taking place in the period 1970-93.  The nonunion indicator is one for those plants that were not unionized. All the data are 
from the LRD, except for foreign ownership and unionization indicators, which are constructed from data in Modern Tire Dealer. All the specifications 
contain calendar year indicators (coefficient estimates not reported). The heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 78  Raghuram Rajan, Paolo Volpin, and Luigi Zingales 
and this effect is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Interestingly, 
this effect is due entirely to foreign acquisitions. 
The results are less clear for employment. If we control for plant-specific 
factors, acquisitions do not seem to have any effect on employment. How- 
ever, decomposing acquisitions further, acquisitions increase employment, 
albeit not statistically significantly,  while if the acquirer is foreign, employ- 
ment falls. 
Comments 
In sum, we find no evidence supporting the idea that acquisitions were 
aimed at disciplining managers who were delaying the closure of inefficient 
plants or were overinvesting in existing plants. Assuming foreign acquirers 
made sensible investment decisions, we find quite the opposite; there was 
some underinvestment before the plants were acquired." 
This is not to say that internal control systems worked perfectly, only 
that much of  the needed restructuring had taken place before the acqui- 
sitions. We will  argue that the advent of radials and the inability of the 
conglomerate tire manufacturers (General, Goodrich, and Uniroyal) to 
improve their position even with such dramatic change simply confirmed 
for them the need to get out of the tire industry. Thus they were unlikely 
to overinvest in tires. Goodyear was fortunate in 1972 to get a CEO who 
was an outsider, understood the potential of radials, and quickly imple- 
mented the needed restructuring. Firestone best exemplifies a firm's failure 
to rationalize its operations (see Sull 1996), but even it got an outside CEO 
in 1979 who quickly closed down plants. Thus it was not the inability of 
internal systems to respond quickly to the radials that led to takeovers by 
the foreign firms. 
Rather, we will argue that the conglomerate tire manufacturers did not 
have a secure enough position in profitable markets to justify the demand 
for continuous innovation. They were ready to sell out, though during the 
1970s and early 1980s, there was no obvious domestic buyer, But during 
this time, car exports and cross-border car production  by  domestic car 
manufacturers increased. Large manufacturers with secure domestic mar- 
kets-Michelin,  Pirelli,  Bridgestone,  and  Continental-were  eager  to 
move into the United States and realize the economies of scale in product 
development and marketing. Even if they wanted to, Goodrich and Uniro- 
yal, who had neglected R&D and investment in the tire business and had 
withdrawn from international tire production in the  1970s, were poorly 
positioned to capture these economies. General Tire was too small and, 
furthermore, had little international experience to speak of. Firestone had 
11. For instance, Bridgestone announced capital expenditures of $1.5 billion after it took 
over Firestone, and industry sources suggest that some of this was to compensate for past 
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a severe liquidity problem in the late 1970s as a result of its problems in 
switching to radials. This forced it to withdraw from international opera- 
tions, and it also became a willing candidate for acquisition. Only Good- 
year maintained its international operations even as it switched to radials. 
It had the scale both domestically and internationally to justify the expen- 
ditures on R&D and advertising to keep it competitive with the large for- 
eign manufacturers. As a result, only Goodyear survived the “internation- 
alization” of the industry. 
2.4  What Led to the Eclipse of the U.S. (Owned) Tire Industry? 
We  now elaborate on our explanation. Table 2.9 shows the fraction of 
total sales accounted for by tires for each of the five major manufacturers 
between  1970 and  1985. While Firestone and Goodyear tire sales were 
steady at  approximately 80  percent  of  total  sales, Goodrich  tire  sales 
dropped from 58 percent in 1970 to 44 percent in 1985 and Uniroyal sales 
dropped from 56 percent to 49 percent. This suggests that both Goodrich 
and Uniroyal were  attempting to reduce their stake in the tire business. 
The exception among the diversified conglomerates is General Tire, which 
maintained a steady share at 39 percent, though as we shall see it decided 
to reduce its commitment to the tire business from the early 1980s onward. 
Some of the tire manufacturers report data segment by segment. These 
data are available from Compustat from 1978 onward. While Goodyear 
and Firestone each invested an average of 5 percent of annual tire sales in 
their tire business in the period  1978-86,  General Tire invested only 3.7 
percent while Goodrich invested 3 percent. When we  look at the ratio of 
investment in tires to total investment, the ratio fell from an average of 46 
percent for General Tire in 1978-80  to 25 percent in 1984-86.  Goodrich 
was already investing very little in the tire business, but this fell slightly 
further from 24 to 23 percent over this period. 
Thus it appears that the diversified tire firms were  investing more of 
their cash flows outside the tire business. They appeared eager to get out, 
a fact confirmed by  published and industry sources. 
Table 2.9  Extent of  Diversification away from the Tire Business by Major U.S. 
Producers 
1970  1975  1980  1985 
Goodyear  83  83  83  80 
Firestone  83  83  19  89 
Uniroyal  56  51  49  49 
Goodrich  58  53  42  43 
General Tire  39  36  44  41 
Note:  Percentage of total sales in tires (from company annual reports and from West 1984). 80  Raghuram Rajan, Paolo Volpin, and Luigi Zingales 
Consider Goodrich. It was the first to introduce radials in the United 
States (in 1965), and this turned out to be a miserable marketing failure 
as neither the automobile industry nor the other tire manufacturers re- 
sponded. Tedlow (1 991, 67) analyzes Goodrich’s situation thus: “The fail- 
ure to leapfrog the competition in radials was the beginning of the end of 
Goodrich’s tire business. If they could not dramatically alter their position 
in the industry by pioneering a breakthrough of this magnitude, Goodrich 
management apparently realized they never would. . . . [Pllaying second 
fiddle to Firestone and Goodyear was untenable on a long term basis . . . 
and it was [Firestone and Goodyear] . . . who would determine product 
policy in this industry. . . . In the mid-l970s, Goodrich realized that it had 
to get out of the tire business. . . . The strategy . . . was simplicity itself. 
The tire business was always to generate more cash than it used. . . . [The 
first step] was abandoning the Original Equipment market altogether [in 
the early 197Os].” By  abandoning the OE market (table 2.2 shows that by 
1985 Goodrich was out), it could focus on replacement sales which were 
highly profitable. Of course, the OE market was a way for a firm to invest 
in future replacement sales, so this move was again a form of cutting in- 
vestment. 
Uniroyal, by contrast, had historically been focused on OE sales, spe- 
cifically sales to General Motors. It hoped to make a breakthrough in ra- 
dials in the early 1970s with its Zeta 40M tire. But in order to make it profit- 
able, and perhaps even to sell more in the OE market, Uniroyal had to 
establish a credible presence in the replacement market by  expanding its 
retail stores (recall that automobile manufacturers like a supplier to have 
these stores because they can service tires sold as original equipment). But 
Uniroyal’s internal cash flow was low because of the low profitability of 
the segments it served and it had an enormous debt burden, especially in 
the late  1970s (average interest coverage in the period  1976-80  was 2.4, 
the lowest in the industry). Moreover, it had an unfunded pension liability 
that, in 1979, amounted to 79 percent of its net worth. So Uniroyal faced 
a cash crunch just when it needed to expand its network of stores, and 
they dwindled from 535 in 1972 to none in  1981 (see Tedlow 1991, 59). 
Thus Uniroyal did not have the option of harvesting  its OE sales, and 
limped along investing minimal amounts in maintaining its plants. 
Finally, General Tire, which was run by the O’Neil family, was the only 
true conglomerate. Tedlow reports that “back in 1980, Jerry O’Neil was 
. . . determined about tires. He has no intention of getting out, he thinks 
Uniroyal probably will, and in the end, Goodrich. In the shrunken field, 
he sees General surviving and prospering.” But by  1984, when our data 
show the fall in General Tire’s investment in the tire business, “O’Neil was 
more willing to consider exiting the industry. The possibility of spinning 
the tire business off  into a merger with another firm was on his mind” 
(Tedlow 1991, 84). 
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of radials as a market opportunity where they could challenge the domi- 
nance of Goodyear and Firestone. Even though Firestone made a major 
misstep (see below) that General Tire and Michelin cashed in on, the in- 
dustry was mature and innovation did not result in dramatic sustainable 
advantage. The market segment that was most ready to switch to the inno- 
vation (the automobile manufacturers) was unprofitable. There was sub- 
stantial inertia in the profitable replacement segment, and by the time an 
innovator made some headway, the leaders would have their own products. 
At the same time, the smaller manufacturers had to constantly match the 
successful innovations or else lose market share. Therefore, even though 
we have argued that economies of scale in production were not significant 
for the major manufacturers, significant fixed investments had to be made 
in R&D, advertising, and the distribution network in order to keep up. 
Table 2.10 shows the average investment in R&D and advertising over 
the  1970s and  1980s. The figures for the diversified tire firms should be 
interpreted with caution since they are not by  segment but are for the 
overall firm. Nevertheless, the pattern of investment by  both Goodyear 
and Firestone suggests that the requirement for R&D and advertising in- 
creased dramatically over the two decades, from 3.1 percent in 1971-75 
for Firestone to 4.2 percent in 1986-87,  and from 4.1 percent in 1971-75 
for Goodyear to 5.2 percent in 1986-87.  By  contrast, the level of invest- 
Table 2.10  Investment in R&D and Advertising by Major US.  Tire Producers 















































































Nore: Average R&D and advertising expenses as a percentage of total sales in different pe- 
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ment  by  the diversified  majors  was  smaller, and perhaps  would  look 
smaller still if we had tire segment data. Furthermore, it declined steadily 
for Uniroyal and Goodrich. Again, General is the exception, but recall 
that in the early 1980s it was doing all that was necessary to stay in the 
industry. In fact, General’s investment in R&D seems to mirror its chang- 
ing commitment to the industry. It peaked at 3.1 percent of sales in 1983 
and then fell steadily every year to 1.7 percent of sales in 1988 when the 
tire division was sold. 
To summarize, then, the diversified majors did not have the scale to 
compete on R&D and advertising, or in sustaining the distribution net- 
work. Their decision to sell out, though made at different times, was under- 
standable. We still have to ask why Firestone was taken over, why Good- 
year survived, and why the acquirers were foreign. 
2.4.1  Goodyear and Firestone 
In hindsight, Firestone’s problems can be traced to its large investment 
in the late 1960s in the intermediate technology of belted bias ply tires. In 
order to avoid scrapping its existing investment, Firestone manufactured 
radials through a process that required relatively minor modification of 
the machinery. The resulting product, the Firestone 500 Steel-Belted ra- 
dial,  was  initially successful but  had  tread  separation problems.  Even 
though top management knew about the problem, it was only in 1978 (six 
years after production began) that production was stopped and the tire 
recalled at enormous cost. The popular press was very critical. Tedlow 
(1991, 60) cites  Time magazine  as reporting,  “The company just  kept 
churning out the 500 tires; they just kept failing; customers kept returning 
them. And company lawyers just kept defending lawsuits brought by acci- 
dent victims-and  their heirs.” The damage to the company’s reputation 
was enormous. Firestone’s OE sales fell from 24 percent of the OE market 
to 21.5 percent between 1975 and 1980 (see table 2.2), while its replace- 
ment sales under its own brand name fell from 11.8 percent of the market 
in 1977 to 9 percent in 1981. 
Table 2.10 shows that Firestone’s annual investment in R&D in 1971-75 
was only 1.5 percent of sales while, by comparison, Goodyear’s was 2.4 
percent of sales (and Goodyear’s sales were considerably more). Therefore, 
even though Firestone matched Goodyear in capital expenditure and ad- 
vertising, it lagged behind in expenditure on R&D, which may partly ex- 
plain its quality problems. 
Soon after the recall, John Nevin, who had been CEO of Zenith, be- 
came Firestone’s CEO. The firm had now become, he declared, “a com- 
pany of limited resources. The day has passed when Firestone can say: We 
are a tire company and we will participate actively in every element of the 
tire business, throughout America  and throughout the world”  (Tedlow 
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of the tire business and diversify. As we  will argue, the economics of the 
business had changed to make this strategy infeasible. 
Goodyear, by  contrast, made  all the  right  decisions early  on.  Even 
though it was not the first out with radials, it neither attempted to skimp 
on the investment necessary to convert to radial production  nor did it 
compromise on the quality of radials produced. A key factor in this was 
Charles Pelliod, CEO from 1972 to 1982, who came with substantial expe- 
rience of radials from Goodyear’s European subsidiary. According to in- 
dustry sources, he saw the writing on the wall and forced Goodyear to 
make the difficult decisions to close down old plants and invest heavily in 
new ones. As can be seen, Goodyear’s spending on R&D and advertising 
also went up at this time. But Pelliod also wanted to diversify out of tires. 
This did not happen until he was succeeded by  Robert Mercer as CEO, 
after which Goodyear bought the Celeron Corporation (an energy com- 
pany) in 1983 and started investing in the All-American Pipeline. Despite 
the sudden attempt at diversification (which proved disastrous), Goodyear 
did not  reduce its investments in the tire business. In fact, both R&D 
and advertising increased, even as the firm was diversifying outside the 
tire business.L2 
2.4.2  The Eclipse of the U.S. (Owned) Tire Industry 
Even while the U.S. manufacturers were struggling to adapt to radials 
and shut down excess capacity, another dramatic change was taking place 
around the world. The automobile industry was becoming more global 
and its methods of design and production were changing. There was in- 
creasing talk of producing the same car for different markets at different 
locations. The Japanese were the first to do this with cars like the Honda 
Accord, which was produced in both Japan and the United States. Simi- 
larly, as U.S. and European tastes converged, the U.S. automobile manu- 
facturers started planning for production in both the United States and 
Europe. It made sense to have close cooperation between the tire supplier 
and the car manufacturer at both the design and manufacturing stages. 
Just-in-time manufacturing made it almost imperative that tires be pro- 
duced close to the locale for automobile assembly. The greater the number 
of markets in which a tire manufacturer produced, the shorter the supply 
cycle and the more valuable the supplier would be to the car manufacturer. 
A related reason for a global presence is that car exports increased tremen- 
dously. A tire manufacturer who had a presence both at the point of pro- 
duction and in the country to which the car was exported would be able to 
take advantage of replacement sales. Furthermore, the car manufacturer 
12. It is unlikely that pipelines need much R&D and advertising. So  even though we only 
have data on firm-level R&D and advertising to sales, the firm-level ratio is likely to underes- 
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would be able to get some of the benefits of the advertising done by the tire 
manufacturer in the export market. In sum, the increasing cross-border 
production and trade of cars increased the need for multinational tire pro- 
ducers. 
But barring Goodyear, the U.S. tire manufacturers had spent the 1970s 
concentrating their resources on  domestic radial  production  and with- 
drawing from foreign markets. West  (1  984) reports that Firestone exited, 
among others, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Australia, Sweden, and 
Chile. Uniroyal sold its entire European tire operations to Continental in 
1979 and also quit Australia. Goodrich exited Australia, Holland, West 
Germany, and Brazil, and General Tire quit Spain and Venezuela (it did 
not have much of an international presence anyway). Interestingly, many 
of the plants were sold to the big foreign producers such as Continental, 
Bridgestone, and Pirelli. In fact, Continental became a multinational pro- 
ducer largely as a result of its purchase of Uniroyal’s European operations. 
Thus the conglomerate tire manufacturers, in pursuit of their objective 
of reducing their exposure to the tire business, sold their foreign plants. 
As the car manufacturers geared up to produce transnationally, the con- 
glomerates had the choice of either returning anew to foreign markets or 
exiting the tire business entirely by selling their U.S. holdings. By contrast, 
the foreign multinational tire producers such as Bridgestone, Continental, 
Michelin, and Pirelli only needed a U.S. base to round out their portfolio. 
Given that new capacity was not needed by the late 1980s even in radials, 
and that the multinationals’ position in their domestic markets was much 
stronger than the US. conglomerates’ position  in  the United  States, a 
transfer of ownership of the tire business from the U.S. conglomerates to 
the multinationals made eminent sense. 
One could ask why Goodyear or Firestone did not buy out the tire op- 
erations of  the conglomerate manufacturers earlier. Apart from a lack of 
funds on the part of these two firms, the foreign manufacturers probably 
valued the conglomerates more: in  order for the foreign manufacturers 
like Bridgestone, Pirelli, or Continental  to be  credible partners for the 
automobile firms, they needed a U.S. production base. By contrast, neither 
Goodyear nor Firestone needed additional U.S. capacity. Rather, in all 
likelihood, they would probably lose some of the OE sales of the acquired 
firm as automobile manufacturers rebalanced their portfolio of suppliers 
to avoid too much dependence on one vendor. Thus the nature of the 
industry made it hard for mergers between U.S. firms to take place. Not 
coincidentally, the only merger that was consummated, albeit temporarily, 
was between Goodrich and Uniroyal. This was clearly helped by  the fact 
that Goodrich had no OE sales. 
Firestone was not interested in exiting the tire business. But it was ex- 
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lines and countries-in  what had become a full service, global business. 
Tedlow  (1 99 1,  44)  cites the  vice  president  of  international  sales thus: 
“When we  withdrew from radial truck tires in the United States, our over- 
seas customers whose business with us is 25 percent for trucks, saw it as a 
lack of  commitment to tires. . . .”  Firestone simply did not have the re- 
sources to compete. If one had to point to a single factor leading directly 
to its demise, it would have to be its lack of attention to R&D and quality 
control that, in turn, led to the Firestone 500 disaster. 
2.5  Conclusions 
Our analysis of the forces that led to the demise of the U.S. tire industry 
points to two major factors. First, the U.S. tire companies were the last to 
switch to radials. They faced this choice when the prospects of the entire 
tire industry were  most grim. While their competitors had already paid 
the sunk costs, U.S. firms had not and, as a result, were more resistant to 
invest. If any major player had to leave, the U.S. firms were the most likely 
candidate. As a result, in this period they did not invest sufficiently in their 
plants, which may partly explain the large capital expenditure made by for- 
eign acquirers after the takeover as well  the lower productivity of  these 
plants. 
Second, the internationalization  of  the market for cars triggered  the 
need for tire producers to follow their customers. Since the flow  of cars 
was toward the United States, it was natural that foreign tire firms wanted 
to penetrate the U.S. market and not the other way around. In the absence 
of major growth in the market, the way to acquire a presence in the United 
States was to integrate with existing producers. 
Of  course, a number of factors may explain why  U.S. manufacturers 
were  taken  over  by  foreign manufacturers  rather  than  the  other  way 
around. Of these, the most interesting possibility is that takeover legisla- 
tion is much more friendly to targets in other countries, making it easier 
for ownership to change in  one direction than the other. Understanding 
the influence that these barriers have in shaping international competition 
is an important topic for future research. 
From a policy perspective, it is  not clear that  any changes are war- 
ranted. While there may have been insufficient incentives to innovate in 
the competitive U.S. domestic market, the internationalization and con- 
solidation of  the market  ensured each  of  the  large manufacturers  has 
the scale as well as enough pockets of market power to reward innovation. 
Also, an international manufacturer can ignore the U.S.  market only at 
the risk of losing credibility elsewhere. Therefore, despite the eclipse of the 
U.S.-owned tire industry, the U.S. consumer has no cause for complaint. 86  Raghuram Rajan, Paolo Volpin, and Luigi Zingales 
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Comment  Robert H. Porter 
Rajan, Volpin, and Zingales are to be congratulated for carefully assem- 
bling evidence from a broad variety of sources and for providing an inter- 
esting interpretation of this evidence. Their story is well told and provoca- 
tive. My role as a discussant, however, is to question whether their story 
stands up to scrutiny and to describe some issues that might warrant fur- 
ther research. 
Robert H. Porter is the William R. Kenan, Jt,  Professor of Economics at Northwestern 
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I cannot claim any expertise on the tire industry. I am not an avid, or 
even occasional, reader of Rubber World. Moreover, this industry has not 
been the subject of much previous research in industrial organization. For 
example, I could find no reference to the tire industry in the textbooks by 
Carlton and Perloff (1994) and by  Scherer and Ross (1990). Hence my 
comments are those of an outsider. 
Rajan, Volpin, and Zingales seek to discriminate among three explana- 
tions of why the US. tire industry experienced a series of hostile takeover 
bids in the 1980s, and why most of the acquired companies ended up under 
the control of foreign tire manufacturers. The authors call the first expla- 
nation “neoclassical.” Essentially, according to this explanation the merg- 
ers were necessary to realize efficiency gains in production or distribution. 
Foreign firms were more experienced with radial production, which came 
relatively late to North America, and the takeovers may have been the 
only mechanism to achieve cost savings quickly. 
The second explanation credits managerial factors associated with over- 
investment. In particular, the existing management may have been intran- 
sigent or unwilling to make necessary changes. Changes may have been 
necessary because the increases in tire durability associated with the intro- 
duction of radials led to excess productive capacity. 
The third explanation is an industrial organization story. According to 
this story, automobile production and marketing were becoming increas- 
ingly global, and  as a consequence global production  of  tires became 
efficient. Foreign firms had greater relative expertise with radials. De novo 
entry by foreign companies in the United States would have led to excess 
capacity, and so takeovers were the least cost method of globalizing the 
U.S. industry. Why was there new entry rather than the necessary invest- 
ments in R&D by the incumbent manufacturers once radials were intro- 
duced? Because the new entrants did not internalize the effect of new ra- 
dial  investments on  the  value  of  sunk  investments in  belted  bias  ply 
manufacturing, the old technology. It was not easy to convert existing 
belted bias ply plants to radial production. Why were the entrants foreign, 
not domestic? Because only they had sufficient expertise with radial tech- 
nology. Why were there takeovers? Better that than going through a war 
of  attrition to knock out inefficient or outmoded capacity (i.e., the infe- 
rior technology). 
The authors prefer the third explanation. They rebut the second, mana- 
gerial, explanation with two key facts. First, the transition of U.S. manu- 
facturing capacity to radials was largely complete prior to the takeover 
wave. Second, radials were not that much more durable than belted bias 
ply tires, and replacement sales of tires actually increased in the relevant 
period, perhaps because of increasing awareness of and demand for safety, 
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was one of the first proponents of the managerial explanation of takeovers 
in the tire industry, and considerations of comparative (and perhaps abso- 
lute) advantage dictate that I defer to him to defend this story. 
In the case of the neoclassical explanation, the fact that radial conver- 
sion preceded  the takeover wave does not preclude the possibility that 
there were unrealized efficiency gains that could be achieved only with a 
change in management. The centerpiece of their rebuttal of the neoclassi- 
cal explanation is the total factor productivity computations summarized 
in table 2.6,  which are based on a regression analysis of census of manufac- 
turing plant-level data. 
The regression analysis considers a panel of sixty-seven plants in the 
years 1967 and 1972-93,  inclusive. There are 720 plant-years of data, so 
the average plant has a sample life of eleven years. The main regression 
equation employs ordinary least squares, and the logarithm of value added 
is regressed on the logarithm of labor (production worker equivalent man- 
hours), the logarithm of a capital stock measure (net property, plant, and 
equipment), and a variety of dummy variables, in many instances includ- 
ing plant fixed effects. The use of plant fixed effects is a major improve- 
ment on comparable studies, especially since the set of acquired plants 
does not seem to be similar to plants that were not acquired. I return to 
this point below. 
The coefficients of most interest to Rajan, Volpin, and Zingales are as- 
sociated with the dummies for plants that were owned by foreign manufac- 
turers and those that were acquired after acquisition. The sum of these 
two coefficients is a measure of the average productivity change in plants 
that were acquired by  foreign companies, in years after the acquisition. 
The sum of these coefficients is negative in all the regressions considered, 
although apparently not always significantly different from zero. I say “ap- 
parently” because standard errors are not reported for the sum of the two 
coefficients. Nevertheless, the coefficient sum indicates that there was not 
a productivity  gain at the plant level associated with foreign takeovers, 
contrary to the neoclassical explanation. 
I have some concerns with the reported regressions, however, and with 
the interpretation of  the regression results. Because of these concerns, I 
believe that it may be premature to dismiss the neoclassical explanation. 
First, the coefficient on the labor variable is greater than one in many 
of the reported regressions, and greater than 0.83 in all. These values are 
implausible, and probably inconsistent with the interpretation of the esti- 
mated equation as a production function. Measurement error of both the 
capital stock and labor input is a potential concern, as is potential endo- 
geneity of the labor variable. Similar coefficients were found by Burnside, 
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (1995, 67-110),  for example, in their study of 
two- and three-digit manufacturing industry data. (One of their three-digit 
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suspect, and in particular that capital utilization is poorly proxied. Rajan, 
Volpin, and Zingales follow their lead in table 2.6C, which describes re- 
gressions that employ energy consumption as a proxy for capital utiliza- 
tion. The results are similar to the regression equations in table 2.6A that 
employ capital. However, Burnside et al. also correct for endogeneity of 
their labor and capital utilization regressors, and they then obtain more 
sensible production  function  parameters.  Rajan,  Volpin, and  Zingales 
make no attempt to correct for simultaneity bias. The issue here is not that 
getting more reliable estimates of the capital and labor coefficients is of 
intrinsic interest, but rather that the foreign ownership and acquisition 
dummy variable coefficients may be biased because of biases elsewhere in 
the estimated equation. 
Second, one wonders about potential sample selection bias associated 
with comparing plants that were closed during the sample period to those 
that remained open. In this sample, 20 percent of the plants were closed 
during the period considered. The positive coefficient on the age variable 
is  symptomatic of  a potential problem, if  some older plants survive be- 
cause they are relatively productive. Olley and Pdkes (1996), who study 
productivity in telecommunications equipment plants using similar data 
from the Census Bureau, describe the potential  biases and methods of 
correcting them in detail. If there is sample selection bias, then the equa- 
tions reported in tables 2.6 and 2.7 should be estimated jointly. Note that 
the coefficient on the age variable is implausibly large in the fixed effects 
regressions. A coefficient of 0.05 implies that productivity grew 5 percent 
per year, for a productivity gain of more than 70 percent over the eleven- 
year sample life of an average plant. Again, the problem is that the coeff- 
cient seems inconsistent with a production function interpretation of the 
estimates. 
Third, as the authors acknowledge, the capital stock is probably mea- 
sured with error. I shall focus on one aspect. Many plants seem to have 
converted from belted bias ply to radial during the sample period. Surely 
some of the existing capital was rendered obsolete by  the transition, yet 
no account is made of this. In short, it is not innocuous to use a standard 
capital stock construction with fixed and constant depreciation in a transi- 
tional environment. The regressions reported in table 2.6B employ a sam- 
ple of plants with at least 80 percent radial production and therefore ad- 
dress concerns about whether one can pool observations from belted bias 
ply  and radial plants. But splitting the sample will not necessarily solve 
the problem with capital measurement, for the capital stock of plants that 
were converted to radial may be measured with error in the years immedi- 
ately following conversion. 
Finally, there is a general issue of how to interpret plant-level produc- 
tivity  regressions  in  this  instance.  The  firms  under  consideration  are 
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factor productivity did not change, consistent with the reported regres- 
sions, and yet  the takeovers led to firm-level efficiency gains due to the 
consolidation of nonproduction segments of the business, such as market- 
ing, R&D, product design, advertising, or bargaining with the automobile 
manufacturers. 
On the basis of the evidence presented in the paper, I would argue that 
the industrial organization explanation may be true, but also that the evi- 
dence is not sufficient to discredit the neoclassical, or efficiency-based, ex- 
planation. 
The paper also raises a number of questions that may be worth pursuing 
in subsequent research. I shall describe a few. 
First, the employment regressions reported in table 2.8 indicate that the 
plants that were acquired by foreign firms were much smaller than average, 
with about half the employment of the typical plant. (The coefficient on 
foreign ownership is -0.50  in the regression in column [6] explaining the 
logarithm of labor, and that on acquisition in column [5] is -0.43.) Again, 
one wonders whether it is appropriate to pool these smaller plants in the 
productivity regressions. But  the coefficients also indicate that  the ac- 
quired plants were atypically small. The fact that capital expenditures in- 
creased after acquisitions, as indicated by the capital expenditure fixed ef- 
fects regressions in table 2.8, might be explained by underinvestment by 
domestic owners, as the authors claim. There may also have been an in- 
efficient scale of operations in acquired plants prior to acquisition. 
If the account in the paper is accurate, why was there a complete shift 
from belted bias ply to radial tires? Rajan, Volpin, and Zingales indicate 
that there are some advantages to belted bias ply  in terms of their ride. 
Now that gas mileage is not as great a concern for consumers (as real gas 
prices have returned to pre-OPEC levels), why can’t the two types of tires 
co-exist in the market to satisfy the various consumer preferences? 
Another (small) puzzle is why,  according to table 2.3, the replacement 
market went 100 percent radial before the original equipment (OE) mar- 
ket. In  1992, for example, 89 percent  of original equipment sales were 
radials, yet radials accounted for 99 percent of replacement sales. Either 
the numbers are incorrect, or belted bias ply original equipment sales are 
for export, or belted bias ply replacement demand is being met by imports 
or retreads. Note that the car production numbers omit small trucks and 
minivans, which account for an increasing share of  original equipment 
sales over the sample period. 
A striking feature of table 2.1 is how  stable global concentration mea- 
sures have  been  over  the  period  considered, especially given  the  pro- 
nounced cycles in the demand for tires (mirroring fluctuations in automo- 
bile sales), technological changes in the production of tires, and significant 
changes in the structure of  the global automobile industry. Perhaps the 
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requirements of the automobile industry. That is, it may be optimal for 
the car companies to have about nine effective competitors among tire 
suppliers. Nine is the approximate inverse of the Herfindahl index. This 
inverse is sometimes referred to as the number of effective competitors, for 
it is the number of symmetric firms consistent with the calculated Herfin- 
dahl index. 
The data set used in the productivity and plant closure regressions of 
tables 2.6 and 2.7 does not seem to be as extensive as one might wish, 
especially in the case of  the plant closure regressions. A total of thirteen 
plants closed in the sample studied in  table 2.5, yet  table 2.4 identifies 
twenty-four plant closures in the industry between 1976 and 1986. Virtu- 
ally all of these closures preceded the takeovers, consistent with the story 
favored by the authors. But a full story of plant closure decisions might 
focus on the broader sample. 
An important issue that is not considered in the paper is why mergers 
were  necessary to realize efficiency, managerial, or strategic gains. Why 
were joint ventures or other contractual arrangements not employed? 
It would also be interesting to learn more about what happened in this 
industry after the takeover wave. Are the mergers considered successful? 
For example, Milgrom and Roberts (1992, 510) cite the Bridgestone take- 
over of  Firestone as an example of  an extreme takeover premium. Ac- 
cording to Milgrom and Roberts, the prebidding value of Firestone shares 
was on the order of $1 billion, and the final price paid by  Bridgestone 
approximately $2.6 billion, amounting to a premium of  160 percent. Is 
this large takeover premium thought to be warranted? Michelin is described 
in a recent issue of the Economist (“Michelin Gets a Grip,,’ 1 March 1997) 
as emerging from troubles associated with the debt it incurred in its acqui- 
sition of Goodrich. Is this merger a success? And how has Goodyear, the 
one U.S. company that survived without being acquired, fared in compari- 
son to its rivals? The sample for the total factor productivity regressions 
does not cover many years after the takeovers, so that it is conceivable 
that a longer-run analysis may yield different conclusions. A return to the 
numbers a few years hence may provide a more definitive answer. It is also 
conceivable that the mergers occurred because of hubris or false expecta- 
tions of synergies on the part of the acquiring firms’ managers, consistent 
with the experience in  several takeovers studied by  other papers in this 
volume. The “eclipse” of the U.S.  tire industry may have occurred because 
the acquired firms were offered a price far in excess  of  the value of the 
company, even under optimal management. 
Finally, Rajan, Volpin, and Zingales argue in section 2.2.5 that the do- 
mestic tire industry faced a hold-up problem in converting to radials. They 
describe the necessity of  coordinating conversion with  the  automobile 
manufacturers, as well  as the  automobile companies’ ability to extract 
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claim, was inefficient delay in the introduction of radials. But the numbers 
of players involved is not large, and the tire and automobile companies 
were partners in longstanding relationships. One might expect that con- 
tractual remedies could have been found for any hold-up problem, and 
therefore that the delay in introducing radials may be due to other factors. 
As the authors argue elsewhere, the automobile industry was not a leader 
in  the  introduction  of  many  other  design  innovations  in  the  period 
around 1980. 
None of the preceding skepticism should detract from the contributions 
of the paper. The authors have carefully combined data from a variety of 
sources, they employ appropriate techniques  to analyze their data, and 
their economic analysis is novel and plausible. In short, this paper repre- 
sents best practice methodology. But like most good research, it whets 
one’s appetite for more, to corroborate results or to investigate alterna- 
tive explanations. 
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